Anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) measures have succeeded in restricting the
I. INTRODUCTION
The international fight against money laundering began in the 1960s, but with the signing of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit spected. 17 Consequently, this is not just a matter of combating money laundering and terrorist financing, but also of combating terrorism itself and the threats it poses to our national security.
Whether the FATF will add a forty-first Recommendation to its current 40 (40 Recommendations) 18 or a tenth Recommendation to the 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (9 Special Recommendations; collectively the 40+9 Recommendations),
19 has yet to be announced. 20 Moreover, what an additional Recommendation might look like is also unknown. But in order for any new Recommendation to be effective, the FATF needs to go further than it has in the past.
Any new Recommendation on TBML should encompass not only the financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions (DNFBP) currently addressed in the 40+9 Recommendations, 21 but also all those involved in the international trade supply chain. This includes importers and exporters, freight forwarders, shippers, and air courierscompanies referred to as "traders" in the Best Practices Paper. 22 And because most of the largest multinational industrial companies also fall within the definition of "traders," an effective TBML proposal would need to encompass a whole new category of non-financial companies that currently may not be paying close attention to the AML/CFT safeguards embodied in the 40+9 Recommendations. 17 See Susan E. Martonosi 20 The 40 Recommendations are individually identified through the use of Arabic numerals (e.g., 1, 2, 3), while the Special 9 Recommendations by Roman numerals (e.g., I, II, III). 21 Designated non-financial businesses and professions cover five categories of businesses and professionals: lawyers, notaries and accountants when engaged in commercial transactions for clients; dealers in precious metals and precious stones; gambling casinos; real estate agents; and company and trust service providers when engaged in a range of services. Forty Recommendations, supra note 18, at 6-8; Financial Action Task Force, 40 Recommendations Glossary, http://www.fatfgafi.org/glossary/0,3414,en_32250379_32236889_35433764_1_1_ 1_1,00.html (last visited Fed. 1, 2009). 22 Best Practices Paper, supra note 7, at 2 ("The term trader refers to anyone who facilitates the exchange of goods and related services across national borders, international boundaries or territories. This would also include a corporation or other business unit organized and operated principally for the purpose of importing or exporting goods and services (e.g. import/export companies).").
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If adopted, a new Recommendation should require governments to ensure, among other things, that traders adopt a customer identification program, conduct customer due diligence, increase the scope and quality of record keeping, and file suspicious activity reports or suspicious transaction reports, just as financial institutions and DNFBP must do under current AML/CFT standards. In the United States, this would include the four pillars of an AML program under Section 352 of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT Act): (1) internal policies, procedures, and controls; (2) designation of an AML compliance officer; (3) ongoing employee training; and (4) an independent audit function to test the AML program. 23 In order to demonstrate that a TBML Recommendation that imposes new obligations on traders should be added to the 40+9 Recommendations, this article will first highlight the ability of soft law to generate effective coordination in banking and financial issues. From there, the focus will shift to the FATF Recommendations in order to show that the object and purpose of the FATF 24 encompasses efforts to stop TBML. Finally, this article will discuss compliance programs designed to reduce liability for TBML, both under existing AML/CFT laws and regulations, as well as under a new FATF Recommendation or other international action on TBML. IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE TO COORDINATE  FINANCE AND BANKING REGULATION International efforts to coordinate finance and banking regulation rely overwhelmingly on the use of soft law to generate common policies. 25 The use of lex ferenda, as opposed to lex lata, 26 serves several important functions in achieving the desired result of international coordination. Among these functions are speed, flexibility, and simplicity. (stating that a treaty is to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in light of its object and purpose). 25 See generally, Martin Marcussen, OECD Governance Through Soft Law, in SOFT LAW IN GOVERNANCE AND REGULATION 103, 110 (Ulrika Mörth, ed., 2004) (noting the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's six-to-one preference for soft law instruments). 26 The "law as it should be," as opposed to the "law as it exists." 27 See Charles Lipson, Why Are Some Agreements Informal? 45 INT'L ORG. 495, 501 (1991) (discussing how the benefits of choosing informal agreements include avoiding formal pledges, avoiding ratification, being able to modify as circumstances change, and being able to reach agreements quickly).
II. THE USE OF SOFT LAW

CASE
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Because soft law contains neither explicit remedies nor binding enforcement mechanisms, 28 in areas of common concern, soft law can be more quickly and easily developed than agreements that impose specific sanctions for violations of particular provisions. 29 Furthermore, the lack of explicit remedies or enforcement mechanisms makes soft law particularly wellsuited to generate common policies in areas of complex national regulation or new and emerging issues.
30
For new and emerging issues such as money laundering, 31 the lack of specific sanctions in soft law can be an asset. 32 Because soft law avoids recourse to litigation over non-compliance, the language and content of soft law provisions do not require the same degree of consensus as hard law; 33 in other words, crafting soft law permits a degree of speed and flexibility unusual for internationally enforceable agreements such as the 1988 Vienna Convention. As a result, soft law allows states to address new and emerging issues while "provid[ing] an opportunity for experience and experiment," which in turn encourages the flow of information among the parties in order to better address the issue and coordinate in the future. 34 For issues that already receive national treatment in virtually every country, such as the basic elements of bank regulatory law, both the public and private sectors understandably are reluctant to add another layer of specifically enforceable measures onto an already burdensome and often byzantine system of regulation. 35 By relying on soft law to set international standards for national efforts, the overall aim can be achieved, e.g., the criminalization of money laundering, while the methods by which this goal is 28 JOSEPH GOLD, INTERPRETATION: THE IMF AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 301 (1996) ("Soft law expresses a preference and not an obligation that states should act, or should refrain from acting, in a specified manner. The underlying assumption is that behavior, or forbearance from behavior, in accordance with this preference will be directly beneficial to states."). 29 See Lipson, supra note 27, at 501 (discussing the benefits of using informal agreements). 30 Consequently, for an issue such as TBML, which involves both trade and finance and needs to involve a variety of non-state actors, the FATF 40+9 Recommendations can take advantage of the flexibility and range found in soft law instruments to great effect. And although a soft law instrument would preclude certain enforcement efforts that hard law would allow, soft law has been the vehicle of choice in international banking law and has been employed with increasing effect over the last thirty years.
39
A.
International Banking Law: The Utility of Soft Law
Because banks take deposits from the public and are universally subject to a plethora of rules generated by their regulators, 40 banking issues are well suited to soft law in the international sphere.
Despite the non-binding nature of soft law, it "is entered into with the expectation shared by all parties that they will observe it." 41 The international standards concerning banking from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 42 provide a clear example of this expectation of compliance. As a leading actor in international banking standards, the BIS and its Committees, particularly the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, operate almost exclusively through soft law instruments. And although the 36 Id. at 15. 37 Wirth, supra note 32, at 331. 38 
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vehicle through which states have coordinated their AML/CFT efforts internationally.
50
The leading international organization dedicated to setting standards in the field of AML/CFT is the FATF. Although now an independent organization with a finite but renewable mandate, the FATF was created at a 1989 G-7 meeting under the auspices of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 51 to address international money laundering undertaken by transnational organized crime groups.
52
To this end, the FATF first issued its 40 Recommendations in 1990, 53 initially revised them in 1996, 54 and then revised them again in 2003. 55 The 40 Recommendations demonstrate both the flexibility and effectiveness of soft law in generating international action on combating money laundering. The goal of the evaluation/assessment process is to determine whether the AML/CFT framework is effective:
An effective AML/CFT system requires an adequate legal and institutional framework, which should include: (i) laws that create money laundering (ML) and terrorist financing (FT) offences and provide for the freezing, seizing and confiscation of the proceeds of crime and terrorist funding; (ii) laws, regulations or in certain circumstances other enforceable means that impose the required obligations on financial institutions and designated non-financial businesses and professions; (iii) an appropriate institutional or administrative framework, and laws that provide competent authorities with the necessary duties, powers and sanctions; and (iv) laws and other measures that give a country the ability to provide the widest range of in- 
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ternational co-operation. It is also essential that the competent authorities ensure that the whole system is effectively implemented.
78
The process by which the FATF and FSRB mutual evaluations and the IMF and World Bank assessments are prepared has had the practical effect of pressuring countries to adhere to the 40+9 Recommendations, principally through the publication of ratings of individual FATF Recommendations that are part of every evaluation/assessment. 79 While publication of the reports is voluntary, it is rare for a country to refuse to do so. As a result, ratings of the 40+9 Recommendations routinely become public, as do recommendations for improvement of the country's AML/CFT framework. 80 This creates both a mandate for change in each country as well as heightened scrutiny from FATF members, particularly the G-7, to adhere to FATF standards.
2.
Seychelles' Economic Development Act: A brief case study
The FATF's response to the Economic Development Act of the Seychelles provides a clear case of the effectiveness of the FATF in achieving its goals through soft law. In 1995, the Seychelles, a small archipelago in the Indian Ocean, passed its Economic Development Act (EDA ), which was ostensibly designed to attract investment into the islands. 81 The EDA provided that any investor investing over $10,000,000 in certain projects on the islands would receive immunity for any violent or drug-related crimes in the Seychelles.
82
Using the "name and shame" sanctions at its disposal, 83 the FATF publicized the Seychelles law, and called upon its members to "closely scru- 78 Id. at 6. 79 Recommendations 21 and 22 of the 40 Recommendations, provide sanctions based on a "name and shame" principle ranging from letters of warning to diplomatic missions and calls for action to its members. 88 Revised Mandate, supra note 52, at 2 ("The FATF, since its establishment, has focused its work on three main activities: standard setting, ensuring effective compliance with the standards and identifying money laundering and[, since 2001,] terrorist financing threats. These activities will remain at the core of the FATF's work for the remainder of this mandate. Going forward, the FATF will build on this work and respond to new and emerging threats, such as proliferation financing and vulnerabilities in new technologies which could destabilize the international financial system."). 89 (2005) ("As legal measures and law enforcement efforts worldwide continue to tighten the noose around money launderers, terrorists and corrupt public officials, criminals have shown remarkable determination and ingenuity in devising new methods and schemes to launder criminal proceeds or finance terrorist activities over and above the traditional laundering techniques using the formal banking system."). See also Cheney, supra note 13; WILLIAMS, supra note 13, at 61-62 (noting that the U.S. Department of the Treasury's Financial Crimes Enforcement Network has found property management, real estate investment, real estate brokerage, and real estate development companies the most commonly reported entities involved with money laundering). See also Trade Based Money Laundering, supra note 4, at 1 ("Not surprisingly, research has shown that when governments take action against certain methods of money laundering or terrorist financing, criminal activities tend to migrate to other methods.").
2009] TRADE BASED MONEY-LAUNDERING 99
With twenty million containers entering into the U.S. in 2005, a number expected to triple by 2020, 90 and with less than five percent of those containers being physically inspected, 91 the international trade system remains an attractive avenue for those wishing to launder the proceeds of a crime or engage in the financing of terrorism. 92 As noted by Stephen Flynn, former National Guard Commander and senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, "[t]he bad guys know how open the system is. The good guys do not seem to have a real command on it here because we have not paid as much attention to this problem as we need to." 93 Through its monitoring of money laundering typologies, the FATF has identified international trade as one of the three major avenues for money laundering and terrorist financing. 94 Yet international trade has received relatively little attention over the life of the FATF. The other two avenues, abuse of the financial system and the physical movement of cash across international borders, already are well covered by the 40+9 Recommendations. 95 But "[i]nherent vulnerabilities in the international trade system, including the enormous volumes of trade flows, which obscures individual transactions, provide abundant opportunity for criminal organizations and terrorist groups to transfer value across borders." citing a two percent figure) . Although the U.S. Customs and Border Protection maintains that one-hundred percent of all containers are "screened" prior to arrival, they define "screening" as a combination of actual physical inspection, x-ray or non-intrusive inspection, and intelligence analysis designed to identify high-risk shipments. U. The international fight against money laundering began with a focus on illegal narcotics. 98 One of the first multilateral initiatives on the need to combat money laundering came from the BIS 99 in December 1988, when it issued its soft law "Statement of Principles on the Prevention of the Criminal Use of the Banking System for the Purposes of Money Laundering" (BIS Principles). 100 In the preamble, the BIS states that "the increasing international dimension of organized criminal activity, notably in relation to the narcotics trade, has prompted collaborative initiatives at the international level."
101
Negotiated at the same time as the BIS Principles was the hard law Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, which was opened for signature in December 1988, and entered into force in November 1990. 102 The 1988 Vienna Convention required all signatory countries to criminalize the laundering of drug profits. 103 Moreover, when the FATF issued its first annual report in 1990, it noted that the 1988 Vienna Convention's creation by the G-7 was because "the drug problem ha[d] reached devastating proportions," and the resolution creating it was passed "among other resolutions on drug issues." Indeed, of the twelve case studies provided, the TBML Report specifically identified four instances of TBML by transnational drug cartels. 105 Additionally, the FATF acknowledges that "[t]he original 40 Recommendations were drawn up in 1990 as an initiative to combat the misuse of the financial system by persons laundering drug money."
106 As the latest FATF mandate requires it to "build upon [its previous] work and respond to new and emerging threats," a 41st Recommendation on TBML would fit squarely within the FATF's original object and purpose of responding to the threat of money laundering posed by the international trade in drugs, and also its current expanded mandate. 107 
2.
Fit as the tenth Special Recommendation on combating the financing of terrorism
On the other hand, a tenth Special Recommendation on TBML would fit well with the character of the 9 Special Recommendations.
108
While the original 40 Recommendations address states, financial institutions, and DNFBP, 109 the 9 Special Recommendations address entities and organizations not previously covered by the FATF. 110 Eight of the 9 Special Recommendations were adopted at an extraordinary plenary meeting of the FATF held on October 29-30, 2001, 111 following almost immediately on the heels of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1373, which focused on cutting off the sources of funds for terrorists. 112 Although the language of the 9 Special Recommendations mirrors that of the original 40 Recommendations, and the 9 Special Recommendations primarily address states, three of the Special Recommendations deal with alternative remittance systems, 113 With the identification of extensive vulnerabilities in the international trade system to money laundering and terrorist financing, a tenth Special Recommendation may not be far behind the other nine. In February 2008, the FATF issued a report entitled "Terrorist Financing" (Terrorist Financing Report) that included a case study from Belgium that illustrated a real world example of TBML being used to support a terrorist organization.
117
In the case study, large amounts of dollars flowed into the Belgian account of a business enterprise, and Euros flowed out to "Individual A," who resided in the Middle East. 118 The large inflows were the proceeds from the sale of conflict diamonds that "Individual B" and "Individual A" had smuggled into Belgium, and authorities discovered that "Individual A" and "Individual B" intended this transaction to benefit a known terrorist organization.
119
Other incidents in the Terrorist Financing Report center on the use of the international drug trade to benefit terrorist organizations.
120 Case studies submitted by the U.S., the Netherlands, and Turkey describe how terrorist organizations either control or derive substantial benefit from international drug trafficking networks.
121
What is most notable about these case studies is the striking similarity among the money laundering and financing techniques of international drug cartels, terrorist organizations and other transnational criminal networks. The main difference is to whom the proceeds of the illegal activity are delivered. In one case, the benefits go to a Belgian diamond trader, and in another, the benefits accrue to an international terrorist organization. Indeed, "the greatest risk" is that a company operating with integrity could, inadvertently and through the normal course of its business, be aiding "the proliferation of WMD."
122 These risks in the international trade system should be addressed by those most directly involved in it, because they are 116 As its mandate was extended in 2004, the FATF acknowledged that much work remained in its counter-terrorist financing mission, and stated that a "stronger connection between the typologies exercises and the standard setting task of the FATF must be created." 123 Having recently identified TBML as one of three major avenues by which to launder proceeds of a crime, a new Recommendation on TBML would fit with either the character of the original 40 Recommendations or the 9 Special Recommendations on CFT.
Now that this risk is known and the extent of its dangers are becoming apparent, the threat of TBML may no longer be ignored by companies in the international trade supply chain-to do so exposes such businesses to potential civil and criminal liability. Consequently, what TBML is, how to spot it, and how to prevent it, have become significant issues for both the public and private sectors. Although FATF's Best Practices Paper calls for gathering more and better information to help identify "other measures that could be considered in combating illicit use of the trade system," 124 the FATF and others, in particular the five U.S. banking regulators, 125 have already produced useful guidelines on reducing potential exposure to TBML.
A. The Definition of Trade-Based Money Laundering
The June 2006 TBML Report defines trade-based money laundering as the process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through use of trade transactions to legitimize their illicit origins. 126 This can be achieved through a variety of methods, including misrepresentation of the price, quantity, or quality of imports or exports, or by tax and/or customs fraud. The methods employed vary in complexity, and often misrepre-
[ Reducing criminal liability
First issued in 1987, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (Sentencing Guidelines) provide Federal judges with a tool to set criminal sentences for those convicted of violations of Federal law. 160 The Sentencing Guidelines are designed to promote uniformity in sentencing under the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which created the United States Sentencing Commission as an independent agency within the judicial branch. 161 The Sentencing Guidelines are also employed by Federal prosecutors in settlement negotiations with criminal defendants.
In order to promote uniformity in sentencing, the Guidelines provide a formula for determining criminal penalties which includes "base levels,"and aggravating and mitigating factors. First, the base level is deter- It is, however, safe to assume that once appropriately unobtrusive methods are developed, container security initiative measures likely will become mandatory. The more this effort is coordinated internationally, the more quickly these voluntary measures may become international standards. 160 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (2008). 161 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1 (2008). mined, 162 followed by the various aggravating and/or mitigating factors, 163 in order to determine a number that corresponds to a range of months in prison for an individual or a dollar amount in fines for an organization. Organizations are vicariously liable for the criminal activities of their agents, 164 but only the individuals who committed the crimes face jail time. 165 Organizations, on the other hand, may face restitution demands, disgorgement, fines and probation, and an organization found to be operating for a criminal purpose could be ordered to divest all of its assets by fine. 166 Chapter Eight of the Sentencing Guidelines deals with the sentencing of organizations and suggests methods by which an organization may reduce and even potentially eliminate liability for crimes committed by its agents through measures designed to reduce the organization's culpability. 167 Under the Guidelines, culpability can be reduced in two ways. The first and most important way by which an organization may reduce its culpability is to institute and maintain what the Guidelines call an "effective compliance and ethics program;" 168 the second way is by self-reporting actual or potential crimes and fully cooperating with prosecutors in any subsequent investigation. Crafting an effective compliance and ethics program An "effective ethics and compliance program" requires that any such program be reasonably designed, implemented and enforced in order to prevent and detect criminal conduct. 170 The program should be aimed at promoting "due diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct," and 112 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
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193
When high-level personnel involve themselves in the crime or establish a culture of tolerance for criminal activity, the culpability score increases. 194 The score also increases if the organization has a prior history or has obstructed justice. 195 If the organization had an "effective compliance and ethics program" in place under its own initiative, as opposed to having such a program in place because of a court order, then the culpability score decreases by three. 196 Further, if an organization quickly reports a discovered offense prior to the threat of investigation, fully cooperates in the subsequent investigation, and "clearly demonstrate[s] recognition" of its responsibility, then the culpability score decreases by five. 197 If the organization does not self-report, but still cooperates fully and clearly accepts responsibility, then the culpability score decreases by two. 198 A clear acceptance of responsibility is worth a decrease of one. 199 So, as an example, if the high-level personnel of an organization with 200-1,000 employees and with no prior history have engaged in criminal conduct, then the culpability score for the organization would be eight because three would be added for the involvement of high level personnel to the base of five. Further, under this example, the maximum recommended multiplier on the fine would be 3.2. 200 If, however, the organization in question had an effective compliance and ethics program, quickly self-reported, fully cooperated, and accepted responsibility, then the culpability score would be zero, and the corresponding maximum multiplier is a mere .2-meaning that the $175,000 fine would be reduced to only $35,000.
c.
Further guidance on compliance from the Department of Justice
The U.S. Department of Justice also has issued a memo on the liability of organizations entitled "Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations" (McNulty Memo). 201 The McNulty Memo instructs prosecutors to consider the same factors listed in the Sentencing Guidelines in deciding
